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of belonging through laws and science, showing that
in many instances the problem is not to be ascribed
to blackness, or to anywhere in particular, but to
the pseudo-scientific dispute of self-identification
by the apparatus of the state. This is directly related
to the question of how to conceptualise resistance
to racialising surveillance. If surveillance is about
slavery, escaping might be a good option. Dark Mat-
ters hints that we should ask ourselves whether we
wish to constantly surrender our bodies as data, as if
that was in fact an option. If surveillance is framed
as anti-blackness, going back to black(ness) might
be a decisive counter-surveillance trick, but, then,
performing whiteness or trying to pass in terms of
race and gender (to the extent this is inspired by the
narratives of runaway slaves) could also be regarded
as genuine revolutionary moves. After much travel-
ling through the dark side of surveillance and its suf-
ferings, Browne ends up somehow oddly celebrating
the sharing of style tips to confuse artificial intel-
ligence, along with some other accidental counter-
performances and symbolic gestures of defiance in
the face of thewhite gaze,without really questioning
the limits and effectiveness of these confrontations.
In this context, what really stands out as a per-
plexing gap in the argumentation of Dark Matters
is a deeper reflection on the relationship between
surveillance and the Black Lives Matter movement.
Triggered by the murder of Trayvon Martin in 2012
by a Neighborhood Watch volunteer, Black Lives
Matter is unquestionably rooted in a reaction against
surveillance’s violence, a visible answer to the bar-
barity of the gaze. Additionally, the movement has,
since then,been regularly reignited by images of bru-
tal anti-black racism, often obtained from police car
and body cameras, as well as smartphone and CCTV
footage, that incarnate a paradigmatic instance of
complicated (non-exclusively dark, non-exclusively
white) sousveillance. Thinking about surveillance
from this standpoint could have made more explicit
the tensions between the blackness of surveillance,
on the one hand, and on the other, what the Dutch
research and design studio Metahaven term ‘black
transparency’: that is, the potentially disruptive uses
of counter-information. Oscillating between the ac-
cidental disclosure of secrets and the systemic con-
cealing of information, black transparency is not a
straightforward remedy, and certainly not the con-
trary of surveillance. It is rather a counter-weapon
acknowledging that surveillance is an exercise of
power, and a reminder that, because it is not blind,
surveillance can never be subverted by simply being
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Following an earlier study of ‘post-theological think-
ing’ in thework ofAlainBadiou,QuentinMeillassoux
and Jean-Luc Nancy (2011), Christopher Watkin’s
new book on several contemporary French philo-
sophers considers the way in which they approach
human beings. It explores both how they understand
what is distinctively human, and how they present
this distinctiveness in relation to broader forms of
life, existence or being. The more open and inclus-
ive their figure of the human, Watkin argues, the
more successfully it evokes the peculiarly elusive and
multi-faceted nature of its object.
Watkin structures his account of the five thinkers
named in the subtitle of his book in terms of a
broadly linear story of progress; one that begins with
a relatively closed and thus relatively limited and
exclusive figure of the human, and that culminates
with a maximally open celebration of human actors
as part of an all-inclusive relational field. The begin-
ning and end points of this trajectory are marked by
Badiou and Bruno Latour, respectively, with Meillas-
soux, Catherine Malabou and Michel Serres marking
so many successive stages along the way.
Watkin rightly sees how Badiou’s conception of
truth-affirming subjects, despite the ‘inhuman’ aus-
terity of his underlying ontology and the ‘immor-
tal’ or ‘super-human’ inflection of the truths that
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they seek to uphold, nevertheless relies on basic hu-
man capacities like the ability to think, to reason,
to wager, to commit, etc. However universal the
scope for affirmative thoughtmight be, such abilities
themselves serve to distinguish, for Badiou, a genu-
ine human life from the ‘merely animal’ dimensions
of our worldly existence. This ability to affirm a uni-
versal truth exemplifies what Watkin calls, through-
out his study, a delimiting ‘host capacity’, possession
of which serves to police the line between human
and animal forms of life. Reliance on such a ‘gate-
keeper capacity’ immediately raises the problem of
what to make of human beings who, for whatever
reason, have been dispossessed of it – for instance
‘neonates, the senile, those with severe mental dis-
abilities’. What is the status of such figures who lack
the capacity to affirm, in the purportedly universal
affirmations of both Badiou and then Meillassoux?
The value of Latour’s ‘polyphonic and multi-
modal’ approach, by contrast, is that it embraces a
myriad diversity of human figures as an integral part
of an all-encompassing relational network of other
figures, without relying on a specific capacity, sub-
stance or story that might demarcate the hosts that
carry it from those that do not or cannot. The reason
why Latour figures effectively as the pinnacle of the
fieldWatkin surveys is that he finds a way to acknow-
ledge human capacities like language and thought
simply as local instances of more properly univer-
sal phenomena of ‘translation and mediation’ which
appear to apply to all modes of existence. Actors’
identities are then free to evolve without reference
to any underlying or identifying essence, and in ex-
tremis to confront those tipping points where, as a
result of changes in their capacities and relations
to other actors, they might become truly other than
themselves. As a result, the paradigmatic figure of
self-assertive humanity, the modern subject cham-
pioned by Descartes and the scientific revolution (to
say nothing of Rousseau,Marx and subsequent polit-
ical revolutions), is here ‘completely unmoored, dis-
located, distributed, divided up’ (citing Latour). Of
all those Watkin surveys, Latour’s figure of the hu-
man is thus the most open and varied, and ‘the least
prone to dangerous exclusions’.
Serres comes close to similar heights, with his
recognition that the difference between human and
crystal, or mammal and mineral, is only ‘quantitat-
ive’ rather than ‘qualitative’– but he still falls a little
short of Latour insofar as his conception of humans
as uniquely ‘undetermined’ or de-differentiated self-
fashioning animals remains tied to this very unique-
ness, and consequently to a ‘host narrative’ that re-
stores a gatekeeper exclusivity to the figure it up-
holds. Although Meillassoux’s emphasis on contin-
gency and possibility opens his conception of the hu-
man up a little more than Badiou’s, his reliance on
rational thought and affirmation still positions him,
onWatkin’s spectrum,much closer to Badiou than to
Latour.
Malabou, finally, is the central and most thor-
oughly studied figure in this account, since her con-
ception of plasticity stretches any notion of a host
capacity past its limit, and replaces it by a ‘host
substance’. Malabou’s determination to think mind
and brain together allows her to evade the exclus-
ive confines of mental operations like affirming or
reasoning and to explore a biological field that dis-
perses humanity in the midst of a much wider, more
ecological frame of reference, but she nevertheless
stops short of that leap into a fully ‘polyphonic’, fully
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post-anthropocentric cosmos which Watkin associ-
ates with Latour.
Each of Watkin’s readings is admirably clear and
impressively thorough, and his decision to approach
the field in terms of a single over-arching movement
lends his book both a coherence and a momentum
that distinguish it from the great majority of survey-
style overviews. Needless to say, readers with dif-
ferent political and philosophical priorities may well
see, in the overall movement from Badiou to Latour,
something rather different than the broad opening
and progression that Watkin applauds – but there
isn’t space for this argument here, and in any case
politics isn’t one of this book’s central concerns. Two
other question, however, seem harder to avoid.
First of all, given Watkin’s determination to
avoid any reliance on a specifying host capacity or
substance, combined with his determination to ex-
pand the frame of reference as far as possible, the
question of what exactly still serves to demarcate a
distinctively human figure seems hard to pin down.
That is Watkin’s point, of course, in his appeal to
‘multiple, layered accounts of the human’ over any
‘single-aspect’ identification. Nevertheless, in his
recurring reference to the neonates or the severely
senile, what seems to recur are indeed figures in the
most literal sense, figures that we might recognise
as human because, presumably, they appear to con-
form to a recognisably human shape. But this begs
the question of why this should be so, and of where
(or why)we should locate the points at which any fig-
ure per se might cease to look human, in order to ap-
pear as something else.
Second, the more thoroughly Watkin purges his
human figures of their reliance on a host capacity
such as reason or affirmative thought, the more his
own appreciation of the humanity of senile or dis-
abled figures seems tacitly to rely on a form of just
such affirmation. Total elimination of every host ca-
pacity deprives these figures of any opportunity to
affirm their own humanity, of course, as actors in
their own right, and like some of Malabou’s ‘new
wounded’ they can appear here only as the objects of
others’ benevolent concern. But no matter how in-
clusive and diversified our categories of apparently
human-shaped objects might become, doesn’t their
affirmation as human still depend, as ever, on some
actors’ capacity first to recognise them as such, and
then to do what is required, at the level of social or-
ganisation, to affirm and look after them? Watkin’s
book certainly helps us to escape the conventional
limits of humanist affirmation, but to my mind its
celebration of an effectively ‘unlimited humanity’
seems to rely on precisely the sort of affirmative
thought it seeks to undermine.
Peter Hallward
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The punning title of Kate Eichhorn’s book refers
to the ‘somewhat audacious argument’ at its core:
that the xerographic (or dry photocopying) machine
played an overlooked but decisive role in the form-
ation of alternative artistic and political communit-
ies in North America during the late twentieth cen-
tury. As Eichhorn notes, however, evoking the over-
signified margin ‘remains a somewhat perilous en-
deavour’; perhaps as a consequence, this thoroughly
researched study of the emergence and decline of
xerography tends towards a romantic celebration of
the subcultural, alternative or peripheral.
The book begins by providing a succinct history
of xerography’s technological development from the
late nineteenth century onwards; including unex-
pected details such as Edison’s ‘electric pen’ of 1895,
a motorised stencilling device that would eventu-
ally morph into the modern tattoo needle. Post-
Fordist regimes of work hastened these machine ad-
vancements, and yet, as Eichhorn demonstrates, the
burgeoning countercultural movements of the mid-
twentieth century promptly abraded the adminis-
trative and bureaucratic world of white-collar office
employment. The wildly successful North American
copy shop Kinko’s provides a neat framing device
for Eichhorn’s story, a grassroots business founded
in 1970 that generated ‘the space and equipment to
124 RADICAL PHILOSOPHY 2.01
